Bad Tenet-s

In the May 21^st issue of The New Yorker, Jeffery Goldberg examines the fallout of George Tenet’s new memoir, At the Center of the Storm: My Years in the CIA, in which Tenet attempts to set the record straight on a number of things, most notably his role in manipulating intelligence in the lead up to the war in Iraq. It would be nice if Tenet acquitted himself admirably, articulation a sign of intelligence and sure-footedness, something Tenet seems to strive for in his memoir (with the help of Bill Harlow), yet his staccato delivery and obvious nervousness during Goldbrerg’s insightful prodding makes one wonder how this man found himself the head of one of the most secretive and important organizations on the planet. Goldberg also plays operator in the devolving relationship between Tenet and “famed” Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, who has somehow managed to backpedal without peer in his critique of the Bush Administration (seriously, read Bush at War—a favorite among Republican wonks when it was released, followed up with State of Denial—the “must have” Christmas present for any Democrat in 06, and ask yourself if the same man who, in Goldberg’s piece, speaks of journalistic “courage” could have written both). Goldberg is dead on when he cites Woodward’s new-found freedom in discussing Tenet’s view of the infamous “slam dunk” comment as the culmination of a source that is no longer “useful” or “well-placed”. But Woodward is as much a politician as the men he covers (of a lesser variety—despite his inflated sense of self-worth), and although it isn’t without reason to claim that his role in shaping Bush pre-Iraq dogma may have resulted in the direct death (proportionately due to cause) of a few American soldiers and a few hundred Iraqi civilians, he is only an instrument played by bigger and badder musicians. People, believe it or not, like George Tenet.

It would be nice if we could turn the page on Tenet. Say that he was just another body thrown onto the sword by bullies Cheney and Rove. But he did what he did, and despite the fact that his office may be a bit more cramped and his position a bit less glamorous (at least it seems as much in Goldberg’s piece), he was still, believe it or not, the only man who could have done something. When Tenet was appointed by Bill Clinton in 1997 it was only after previous nominee Anthony Lake had been rejected by a Republican Congress, and it was believed by many Republicans that, although respected within the organization, Tenet was ill-equipped to be the head of the biggest intelligence agency in the world. He was a compromise, a second choice from a frustrated administration, and a weak puppet in the eyes of a contentious Republican congress. If they were lucky, Tenet would probably screw up at some point, inadvertently helping tighten the screws on the assailed Clinton Administration. Luckily for him, Tenet provided no such opportunity. Once George W. was elected, Tenet had to feel as if he were on the chopping block, an outsider in an administration that clearly resented anything associated with Bill Clinton (including reliable intelligence), and, as is the case with many promotions in public service, politics ensures that you can only work your way up the ladder, eventually using that ladder to grasp onto a safer, more stable, building in the academic field or private sector. There is no parachute at the top, and Tenet no doubt knew this. But then Al Qaeda, an organization Tenet was well acquainted with, orchestrated a devastating attack on the World Trade Center on September 11^th 2001. Whew!

Here is where the tale of Tenet takes a sour turn. During the subsequent investigation into the September 11^th attacks, Tenent, the head of the CIA—an organization that had had numerous dealings with Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan prior to his jihad against the west, who had one of several leading counter-terrorist intellects (Michael Shurer: a none too big a fan of our current Administration), and who worked closely with Richard A. Clarke in dealing with the Al Qaeda threat—should have screamed to the panel, “We knew this would happen! We’ve been harping about it for months! Here…let me show you this memo we helped draft that will tell you all about it!” But he didn’t, instead Tenet decided to play the, “None of us could have foreseen, blah, blah, blah,” and the “there were communication barriers, yadda, yadda, yadda,” card. It was at this point that it became clear Tenet could be counted on to manipulate anything for this administration. Should we even be surprised when he assured Bush it would be a “slam dunk” making the case against Iraq? Why? There are many complicated explanations for this. But we shouldn’t look so deep. In the end Tenet was a man, like any other, who found himself in his dream job, and would do whatever necessary to keep it. It’s really that simple. It wasn’t about integrity as much as status and, in the aftermath, an almost childlike refusal to avoid complexity and responsibility. That’s it. It would be a much sadder story if there weren’t thousands of dead people strewn about the Middle East: their bodies sticky with blood, sand, and oil.